Protectionism in Trade -- Policy Analysis

  

 

 

 

 

 

Protectionist Trade Policies – The Wrong Move for America

Written as a policy analysis examining the economic theory and providing quantitative analyses of the effects of protectionist trade policies for those legislators who never took economics in college

Kyle Brewster

 


 

To the US House of Representatives Ways and Means Committee,

Pursuant to your request in search of the most economically efficient means by which the government should use its power and influence for the regulation of (or lack thereof) the United States’ economy, I have prepared the following brief to provide useful information for such an endeavor.

Protectionism can be characterized by economic policies that restrict imports from other countries by means of quotas, tariffs, and a variety of other sorts of government regulation/intervention in an attempt to protect domestic industries.

Scarce resources in the domestic markets are typically most efficiently allocated by the free market. Therefore, the government should not play a significant role in the interference with natural operations of the free market unless the benefits of such interference result in a higher net benefit to society than a lack thereof. The examples of government interventionist policies that be will be examining in this brief include tariffs, quotas, subsidies, and involvement in trade agreements.

Whenever it comes to discussion of proposed policy initiatives, the number one priority of the government should be making decisions with an in-depth analysis of cost versus benefits. Such a philosophy for making decisions suggests that the best course of action for government officials to take is one that provides the greatest utilitarian benefit while reducing the costs or negative consequences of such decisions.

With this approach of analysis, decision-makers are able to remain as objective as possible. Total benefits and the total cost are often able to be measured quantitatively in both the short- and long-run. This is able to render many of the political and emotional arguments that are frequently made in attempts to gain favor for one side of the argument irrelevant and only consider the objectivity of the data. As eloquently put by a professor of political science during my university tenure, “Numbers don’t lie. People lie about numbers.”

Summary: With regards to protectionism being used as a tactic for promoting the welfare of the economy and protecting domestic industries, here are my findings:

·        To suggest advocacy of protectionist principles is taking steps back to the mercantilist economic conditions found throughout 16th-18th centuries, with the primary focus of increasing exports, with less focus on the capitalization of comparative advantages and less regards towards lowering price levels that domestic consumers face.

·        Tariffs are a means of restricting free trade, often with the intention of protecting domestic industries. Tariffs tend to result in a reduction of benefits to consumers that is greater than the increase of benefits experienced by producers in a given industry. While there may be non-economic benefits of tariffs, the cost to society at large tends to outweigh their benefits. In addition, tariffs provoke retaliatory measures from the foreign countries that are adversely affected.

·        Quotas have a similar net effect as tariffs. Although the intended recipients of benefit may experience gains in production, those gains are offset by a decrease in consumer benefit and a deadweight loss incurred by society.

·        Even if countries enter into voluntary agreements to restrict trade, there are still negative results.

·        Subsidies also result in a net overall loss to society.  While subsidies may benefit producers, they come at a cost to consumers that outweighs benefits. In addition, subsidies result in the overvaluation of the given good and is not a true representation of the value deemed accurate by the free market.

·        Trade occurs when two parties engage in mutually beneficial exchange. To inhibit such exchange is to inhibit the benefits derived.

·        Rather than engaging in restrictive trade policies to achieve domestic protection and achieve noneconomic objectives, entering into trade agreements can be a more pragmatic means of achieving the same goals.

Classical Schools of Economic Thought

The benefits of the specialization in production and the benefits of trading can be found in economics schools of thought over 200 years ago. Adam Smith, a Scottish philosopher and economist who lived from 1723 to 1790, is considered by many to be the “father of modern economics” (Aune, 2002). Smith was one of the first economists to deeply explore the benefits of the specialization of resources and labor - advantages that can be further exploited with the allowance of free trade on the international level.

While the scale of the international economy did not exist to the same extent during Smith’s lifespan compared to today, the principles he found in his analyses continue to remain applicable. Smith referred to the division of labor as the “greatest improvement in the productive powers of labour, and the greater part of the skill, dexterity, and judgment with which it is anywhere directed, or applied” (Smith, The Invisible Hand, 2008).

The effects of the division of labor can be observed on even the most trifling of levels. This specialization of labor can be found in every wealthy country – generally speaking, the farmer is nothing but a farmer, and a manufacturer is nothing but a manufacturer (Smith, The Invisible Hand, 2008). When laborers specialize in a specific trade, it typically produces three results: an improvement in the dexterity of work they can perform, the savings in time that results from changing jobs, and innovations in technology allow for one laborer to perform the work of many (Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 1789).

Regarding improvements in dexterity experiences, Smith exemplified a blacksmith and a nailer (one who makes nails). A smith, who is adept with hammer but whose sole business is not making nails, might only be able to produce upwards of 200 nails in a given day (with a considerable rate of rejects). Laborers who exercise no other trades but that of nail production have been observed to be capable of making up to 2,000 nails in a given day. Such discrepancies can be further increased with a given production-process is broken down into multiple distinct operations (Smith, The Invisible Hand, 2008).

When a laborer begins work in a new trade, they are seldom keen and hearty at the given process (Smith, The Invisible Hand, 2008). This initial sauntering that results from the unfamiliarity of the work-process is amplified when a given laborer is required to change his is work or use of different tools/machinery frequently. If they aspire to achieve maximum proficiency within a trade, it can best be done by eliminating the time lost resulting from passage between trades (Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 1789).

Smith’s work additionally spoke to the advantage of familiarity of a laborer with production machinery in their given trade. Laborers are more likely to obtain easier/readier methods in pursuit of a goal when their whole attention is directed at that single objective rather than a great variety of things (Smith, The Invisible Hand, 2008). We refer to this concept today simply as multitasking.

Studies have been conducted that support the notion that multitasking impedes on both physical and cognitive ability to complete tasks (Rachel F. Adler, 2012)(Helene Hembrooke, 2003). The idea of self-discovery within a laborers trade to alleviate the burden of work to save labor has been exploited since the beginning of specialized labor (Smith, The Invisible Hand, 2008).

The benefits of specialization of labor allow producers to build a comparative advantage. A comparative advantage is defined as the ability to perform a given task at a lower relative cost compared to competitors (Landsburg, 2008). Late 18th/early 19th century British economist David Ricardo was one of the first to explore the comparative advantage the can be created by engaging in international trade.

Ricardo argued that even if engaging in international trade does not increase the value of a country, the mass availability of imported commodities will benefit consumers by providing them with a higher purchasing power resulting from lower price levels (Ricardo, 1817).

Tariffs & Retaliatory Measures

Tariffs result in an overall net loss to society. While the industry that such tariffs are attempting to protect may experience some benefit, the negative effect on other industries and consumers tends to outweigh those benefits. Refer to Appendix A for further economic theory analyzing the effects of tariffs.

For a contemporary example of the negative implications of tariffs, consider the effects of the tariffs implemented by the Trump administration in Section 232 that had the objective of protecting domestic aluminum and steel production. As part of the platform of bringing jobs back to America and putting “America First,” the Trump administration imposed tariffs of 25 percent on steel imports and 10 percent on aluminum imports. These decisions went against the consultation of Trump’s advisory staff (Swanson, 2018).

Trump took such measures to combat what he described as a threat to national security created by imported metal that was a degradation to the American industrial base, according to an investigation conducted by the Department of Commerce (Swanson, 2018). As expected, these tariffs were supported by domestic firms in steel and aluminum production and opposed by automotive manufacturers, food packagers, and other industries that use steel and/or aluminum as input materials in their production processes, and consumers who would face higher prices as a result.

The actions by the Trump administration have also been condemned in statements from the G7 meetings. The Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors asked the US Treasury Secretary to share their “unanimous concern and disappointment” with regards to the tariffs (Dan Ciuriak, 2018). Using the grounds of national security issues as justification for implementing the tariffs was further criticized by the WTO, who seemed such rationale as implausible and “unsustainable in litigation” (Dan Ciuriak, 2018).

The purpose of these tariffs, according to the Trump administration, was to adversely affect China and their flooding of US domestic markets with cheap metals (Swanson, 2018). The reality of the burden, however, fell on consumers facing higher prices for good with aluminum and steel as inputs and on allied countries, such as Canada, South Korea, and the European Union (Drezner, 2018).

As illustrated in Appendix A, there is an inherent net loss to society at large that results from the government’s issuance of tariffs. The reality of what happened to domestic industries and price levels following the implementation of these tariffs reflects what the economic theory suggests.

The Trade Partnership Worldwide - a consulting firm that applies economic analysis to produce useful, clear, and concise information about the impact of trade policies - conducted an analysis of the estimation of the effects that these tariffs would have (Trade Partnership Worldwide, 2018).

The sectors of the domestic economy that would be positively affected as a result of tariffs, quotas, and retaliatory measures include steel producers, aluminum producers, and several other sectors that are able to attract capital and labor from those displaced from sectors harmed by the tariffs and resulting retaliation. The GDP of the United States as a result is projected to decrease by 0.2 percent annually in the short-term along with a decrease in projected exports (Dr. Joseph Francois, 2018). Other studies and projected may predict different numbers, but still expect a decrease in overall GDP (Dan Ciuriak, 2018).

Employment in the steel and aluminum producing sectors is projected to increase by 26,280 jobs, but reduce employment by 432,747 jobs throughout the rest of the economy. The resulting total net loss is 400,445 jobs. In other words, every one job gained in the aluminum and steel industries would come at a cost of sixteen jobs lost in other sectors of the economy. The projected net loss of jobs would be found in every state (Dr. Joseph Francois, 2018).

Not only is there an inherent net loss resulting from using tariffs as a tactic to protecting domestic industries, but, as previously mentioned, retaliatory measures from the affected countries are almost inevitable. Canada, the European Union, as well other affected countries say that they have no choice but to respond with retaliatory sanctions of their own (Swanson, 2018).

Additional studies of the projected impacts of these tariffs from other institutes expected similar economic woes. Dan Ciuriak and Jingliang Xiao from the C.D. Howe Institute analyzed the reality of retaliatory measures that would take place resulting from the steel/aluminum tariffs – a reality that the Trump administration assumed would not occur. In their summary, they found that the effects of the tariffs would result in the following: reduce US imports by $23.4 billion; reduce US exports by $5.9 billion; reduce exports and increase import penetration in user sectors, thereby worsening the US trade balance (in the user sector) by $12.2 billion; reduce US shipments of user products by $12.7 billion (Dan Ciuriak, 2018).

† User sectors are defined by the Bureau of Industry and Security as the product that the purchaser of ultimately uses and is not re-exported (The Bureau of Industry and Security, 2018). These sectors in Ciuriak and Xiao’s study includes automotive, transportation equipment, machinery and equipment, and electronic equipment.

Their study and simulations further concluded that the Section 232 tariffs would result in an artificially increased price level of US goods. While higher price levels may yield some benefits for domestic producers, it ultimately undermines the ability for the US sectors of steel and aluminum-producing industries to remain competitive in the international market as well as the competitiveness of user sectors (Dan Ciuriak, 2018).

Despite China being the primary target of these trade policy measures, Canada in reality is one of the biggest sufferers resulting from this situation. Canadian GDP is projected to decrease by .33 percent, or $8.1 billion in US dollars.

In addition, Canada is expected to lose around 6,000 jobs in the long-run due to changes in structural employment. While some sectors of the Canadian economy are expected to benefit, the overall net effect is negative (Dan Ciuriak, 2018).

Ciuriak and Xiao also made reference to the game theory implications that these tariffs will cause (Dan Ciuriak, 2018). Refer to Appendix B for further explanation of game theory. With China and other more-adversarial trading partners, the game theory behind trade decisions results in a tit-for-tat situation. With recent trade relations, this strategy has resulted in more retaliation than compromise – often being referred to the media as a “trade war”.

Apart from China and a few other countries, the US has remained relatively friendly in terms of trade policies with our allies in trade. The steel/aluminum tariffs, however, may be changing such a view from other countries. Rather than remaining consistent with historical policies of mutual benefit, the US appears to be flaunting its entrenched position of trading power rather than making policy decisions that have the aim of positive economic development and the promotion welfare (both for the US and its given trading partner) (Dan Ciuriak, 2018).

Ciuriak and Xiao analogized such demonstrations of power to that of the Soviet Union prior to their fall. The implications of presenting such a demeanor may unfold additional changes in our relationships with current trading partners that could result in unfavorable consequences for the US in the future (Dan Ciuriak, 2018).

Furthermore, it is not possible to maximize the benefit of the consumer when holding the interests of producers as a priority. Consider the example of the “Negative Railroad” proposed by French economist Frederic Bastiat in his first series of Economic Sophisms in 1845 (Bastiat, 2011).

The idea of the negative railroad sprung from the advancements in technology (e.g. locomotives) that allowed for transportation to occur via land routes rather than being predominantly restricted to waterways around the time of the Industrial Revolution. As a result of cheaper transportation, producers were able to expand their market reach, thus breaking up local monopolies (which are associated with higher prices and less power to the consumer). With the railroad analogy, Bastiat made the connection of tariffs and other protectionist measures having the same net effect as physically destroying the rails and resulting in a reversion back to using more-costly transportation methods (Rothbard, 1995).

Measures that effectively restrict free trade and the resulting subsequent negative unintended consequences are not unique to the current administration. On June 27, 1973, the Nixon administration placed an embargo on the US exportation of soybean products. The intended purpose of this embargo was to combat high levels of exports and high prices that were the result of government stock elimination (Ray, 2018). At the time, Japan obtained approximately 92 percent of soybean-commodities from the United States with an annual consumption nearing 3 million US dollars (The New York Times, 1973).

Prior to the 1973 embargo, Brazil’s soybean production consisted of only about 18 percent of international sales, while the United States help approximately 80 percent of worldwide sales (Roger LeRoy Miller, 1992). Currently, Brazil produces 33 percent of the world’s production while the US now holds only 35 percent (CLAL, 2018). This embargo is cited as the predominate reason behind the rise of the Brazilian soybean industry that has ultimately lead to a decrease in demand for US-produced agricultural commodities (Roger LeRoy Miller, 1992).

The United States’ decline market share in soybean production can be connected back to the issue created with the Trump administration’s tariffs on steel on aluminum. China is the world’s largest importer of soybean-products, with demand topping 94 million metric tons (Statistica, 2018). China’s demand composes 63 percent of total worldwide imports of soybeans (CLAL, 2017). The declining Chinese demand for US soybeans is resulting in a further heightened demand for Brazilian production. The shift in Chinese demand can be attributed to retaliatory measures from the recent US changes in trade policy (US Department of Agriculture, 2018).

Quotas and Dumping

The negative implications of import quotas (a legal limit imposed on the amount of a given good that may be imported) have a net loss to society similar to that of a tariff. Refer to Appendix C for a further explanation of the theory behind quotas.

Proponents of protectionist trade policies cite quotas as being a beneficial means of preventing/combating import dumping. Dumping is defined as the sale of goods in a foreign market below the price charged in the given domestic market (Arnold, 2016). The intended purpose behind dumping is as an attempt to penetrate a given domestic market, drive out domestic competition, and then raise prices to that of monopolistic competition. Critics of dumping claim that it puts domestic producers of substitute goods at a disadvantage (Arnold, 2016).

Many economists, however, suggest an inherent infeasibility with such a tactic. In the short-run, domestic firms may be at a disadvantage as a result of foreign dumping. In the long-run, once the dumpers raise their prices after establishing a dominant market share, the domestic competition is likely to return. The dumping country would then have then only incurred a long-term loss as a result from selling goods below costs. In addition, domestic consumers benefit from the lower prices and can then use such price savings to add to demand in other sectors of the domestic economy.

Consumer Benefit Derived from Free Trade

When producers are required to compete amongst each other for the demand of consumers, price differentiation is commonly used tactic. Assuming the quality of the goods from competing producers are the same, consumers will be more attracted to the lowest prices. As a result, if producers want to remain competitive with other producers in the industry, they will have to have similar (if not lower) prices.

Consider the literature of Murray Rothbard, an American economist and political theorist. Rothbard illustrated the benefits of trade with the example of the trading relationship between the US and Japan – Japan being a significant trading partner with the US that has the world’s third largest GDP valued at approximately $5,070 billion (International Monetary Fund, 2018).

The effects of being trade allies with such a large economy is found ubiquitously in American society with the products that consumers purchase, especially electronics such as television sets, cars, microchips, and etcetera. The reason consumers so readily purchase Japanese-produced goods over American-produced goods is because Japanese prices are often lower and therefore more competitive compared to American-produced prices (Rothbard, 1995). While American electronics producers may be at a disadvantage when forced to compete with Japan’s lower prices, the consumer is better off in the fact that they get to pay lower prices.

In the example of electronic product trade between Japan and the United States, the transactions are mutually beneficial to each party. Japanese producers are better off having a larger market to sell their product and American consumers are better off by having an international purchasing option with lower prices compared to domestic prices. Instituting any sort of protectionist trade policies with the aim of benefiting domestic producers would result in a deduction of American living standards who are rendered unable to purchase high-quality and lower-priced electronics (Rothbard, 1995).

Two countries engage in trade only if such a relationship is mutually beneficial. Any sort of restrictions that inhibit the trading relationship results in a reduction in benefits for both parties.

Voluntary Export Restraints

Even when two voluntarily agree to limit trade, there are still negative implications to society at large similar to that of unilateral trade restrictions. Consider the voluntary export restraints between Japan and the United States with respect to the automotive industry in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Due to competition from enhanced quality of imported cars, sales of domestically produced cars in fell from 9 million in 1978 to an average of 6 million between 1980 and 1982 (Roger LeRoy Miller, 1992).

As a result of the declining profits from domestic manufacturing, automakers and autoworker unions pushed for protection from international competition. In May of 1981, Japanese car companies (one of the primary sources of imports) agreed to restrictions of US sales of Japanese cars to 1.68 million cars each year (Roger LeRoy Miller, 1992). In 1984, the cap was raised to 1.85 million cars and raised again in 1985 to 2.3 million cars before the termination of the program in 1994 (Crandall, 1987). This agreement was in-effect an import quota on the imports of Japanese cars.

Japan agreed to these conditions because it was their least-costly option with regards to the US’s pursuit of protection for domestic industries from foreign competition. The other option the US could have chosen would have been tariffs on imports of Japanese cars, which would have cost Japan an estimated $11 billion over the lifespan of the agreement (Benjamin, 1999).

The limited supply of imported Japanese cars lead to an increase of the prices of the imports by an average of about $1,200, around 14 percent higher than would have otherwise been without the restrictions (Benjamin, 1999). Adjusted for inflation, the value of the increase in price was $3,097.41 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2018).

For many domestic manufacturers, this was an ideal situation because they faced a considerable amount less of foreign competition. From 1986 to 1990, profits of domestic auto-manufacturers increased over 8 percent – this increase amount to over $2 billion without adjustments for inflation (Benjamin, 1999).

Not only did consumers face higher prices for Japanese cars by a considerable margin, the decrease in competition enabled domestic manufacturers to increase their prices. Because of the high price-demand elasticity (defined as the responsiveness of quantity demanded to a change in price) between quantity demanded and price of cars, domestic producers were only able to raise their prices by approximately 1 percent, which equated to an average of $400 unadjusted for inflation (Benjamin, 1999) (Roger LeRoy Miller, 1992).

The total net loss consumers in 1983 along was $4.3 billion – the annual cost to the public was forecasted to (an in fact did) increase in the following years (Roger LeRoy Miller, 1992). Throughout its lifespan, this trade policy is estimated to have cost American consumers approximately $13 billion (Benjamin, 1999). When adjusted for inflation, these numbers are around $10.9 billion and $33 billion, respectively (CoinNews, 2018).

Even when adjusting the net effect to include gains to domestic producers, the net loss to society was still upwards of $3 billion (or $7.6 billion in 2018 dollars) (Benjamin, 1999) (CoinNews, 2018).

Robert Crandall, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, estimated that the amount of jobs saved as a result of the import restrictions was around 26,000 (Roger LeRoy Miller, 1992). If we consider the $4.3 billion cost per years, each job that was saved in the domestic automotive manufacturing industry cost consumers over $165,000 per year. If consumers would have simply given $100,000 to each autoworker whose job was preserved from the import restraints, consumers would have saved about $2 billion on car purchases in 1983 alone (Roger LeRoy Miller, 1992).

While we can observe the adverse effect on society at large (especially consumers) in the automotive sector that were directly affected as a result of the trade restrictions, the ultimate effect on the rest of society is difficult to observe. It is safe to say, however, that the rest of society on average was negatively affected.

When the United States restricts imports, our trading partners as a result earn less revenue and can no longer can spend as much on domestic exports. This decline in foreign demand results in a decline of exports from domestic industries that export more-heavily. Less trade then results in less demand for labor that services the international trade, such as truck drivers for cross-country transportation and stevedores (those who unload ships) for reception of shipments at ports (Roger LeRoy Miller, 1992).

Protectionist Policies in the Form of Subsidization

Another tactic that is used in an attempt to protect domestic industries from threats of global competition is in the form of subsidization. Refer to Appendix D for an economic analysis of the net effect of subsidies.

One example of government subsidization of domestically produced goods is found throughout the agricultural industry. These policies were initially implemented following the Great Depression where adverse economic conditions and an unfavorable growing environment resulted in prices farmers were able to sell their goods dropping by nearly two-thirds (UNM Library, 1995).

To prevent a situation that could have resulted in the agricultural industry’s inability to produce crops, the government became involved with setting minimum prices - commonly referred to as price floors - for crops produced and subsidizing farmers the difference between the natural market price and the price (UNM Library, 1995).

The result is an increase in the quantity supplied and a decrease in the domestic demand. When only considering the domestic market, the result of the price floor affects consumers in the form of either higher prices or in the form of taxes paid for subsidization programs (see Appendix E). The opportunity cost of those tax dollars otherwise going to other perhaps more economically efficient government expenditure programs.

International demand for US agriculture products it at its lowest point since 2010, with a trend of gradual decline since 2015 (USDA, 2017). Lower levels of demand can be related again to retaliatory measures as a result of protectionist policies emplaced in Section 232. With these two forces acting in unison on the US agricultural sector, not only is the cost of such programs being covered at the expense of the American taxpayer, but it is also resulting in a supply of domestic agricultural products that is not accurately reflective of market demand.

International Support for Free Trade

In more recent economic-history, The General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) was an organizational established to help promote the mutually-beneficial principles of freer trade promoted by economists throughout history. The GATT was a multilateral agreement signed in 1947 with the purpose of the “substantial reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers and the elimination of preferences, on a reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis" (Duke Law, 2017).

On January 1, 1995 the World Trade Organization (WTO) replaced the GATT. Following the WTO’s birth/transformation, it now serves as a permanent organization with an increased scope of coverage, helping to establish international economic regulations and settle disputes between member countries. There are 164 member currently part of the WTO and adhere to the organizations principles and legal requirements (World Trade Organization, 2016).

Trade Agreements

The enabling of competition on the international level has effectively raised the standards of living of consumers from all countries involved by providing consumers with access to lower prices. One route that the federal government can take to obtain such benefits is by taking entering trade agreements

One type of foreign trade policy that pursues the goal of more open trade is with regional trade agreements. The WTO defines regional trade as agreements as reciprocal trade agreements between two or more partners – they include free trade agreements and customs unions (The World Trade Organization, n.d.).

Another type of trade agreement are preferential trade agreements. These are defined by the Congressional Budget Office as treaties between two or more countries that remove barriers to trade and establish rules and regulations for international commerce between the involved parties (Congressional Budget Office, 2018).

One economic benefit of more open trade (that can result from trade agreements) in an increase in workers’ productivity in the long-term. Reconsider the previous example of the US-Japanese electronics industry (Congressional Budget Office, 2018). If more open trade means that consumers prefer Japanese-produced electronic goods over US-produced electronic goods, then there will be an inevitable loss in the US sector; however, this only hold true in the short-run.

In the long-run, those workers who are displaced from the relatively inefficient sectors are able to transfer their labor to sectors in which the US holds a comparative advantage and are thus able to be more productive. Higher productivity results in higher industry average real wages and output, benefiting both producers and consumers (Congressional Budget Office, 2018).

In addition to the reallocation of labor/resources into more productive industries resulting from more global competition, it also forces firms to make physical capital, production process, and other innovative investments in an effort to remain globally competitive (Congressional Budget Office, 2018). Such investments further increase the productivity/efficiency of producers.

This can result in competition amongst producers in the form of higher wages as an incentive to attract more productive workers. Not only do these higher-paid workers then have a higher income (and thus are able to add to demand in other consumption sector of the economy), but their additional productivity contributes to lower prices for the products produced of the firm by which they are employed.

Lower prices as a result from the importation of foreign goods has a greater beneficial impact on lower-income consumers compared to consumers of other demographics – especially in the sectors of food and clothing (Congressional Budget Office, 2018).

There are also non-direct economic reasons that a country might be incentivized to enter into a trade agreement. Conditions of an agreement between two countries could include terms that address protection of intellectual property rights, phytosanitary/sanitary standards (plant/animal), data transfer/localization rules, and requirements of certain environmental and/or labor standards just to list a few (Congressional Budget Office, 2018). Having such provisions as part of trade agreements would help to address any unfair comparative advantages that foreign economies have that harm domestic producers.

With regards to protectionist policies, trade agreements work towards the mitigation of tariff and quota rates.  Prior to the first Geneva round (which established the GATT), tariffs rates of major involved countries was 22 percent (Chad P. Brown, 2015). In 1994 following further expansion to include 128 countries, most tariffs from member countries rarely exceeded 10 percent (Congressional Budget Office, 2018). By 1999, average tariff levels were as low as 5 percent (Chad P. Brown, 2015).

Policy Alternatives

One course of action that we could take is to continue with how the Trump administration is currently attempting to address certain domestic and political issues with the use of tariffs/other protectionist policies. While they do result in net losses to society, there are some benefits that they can bring.

The domestic industries that the tariffs are intending to protect are in fact working. Domestic steel and aluminum manufactures have experienced real gains since the issuance of the tariffs that provided benefits to workers and producers in those industries; however, as we have discussed, the benefits that they provide to the steel/aluminum industries are significantly outweighed by the cost to society (in addition to the deadweight loss paid by society and the inevitable retaliatory measures).

Another argument that is commonly made is with respect to worker wages. This argument, however, often fails to consider the productivity of those workers. Productivity and employee wages tend to be positively correlated.

For example, if an American worker is paid $20 per hour. With a higher wage incentive and the capital (machinery or other technology) at their disposal, they can produce 100 units of a given good per hour. In a foreign economy, a worker may be paid $2 an hours and produce only $5 units per hour doing their work solely by hand (Arnold, 2016).

If the previous example is the case, the discrepancy between the resulting productivity yielded from wages paid is negligible. If foreign sub-par treatment of equally productive workers on the other hand is the case, then domestic producers are in fact at a disadvantage and that must be acknowledged. Regardless of the potential for such a disadvantage, I believe there are better ways to deal with those issues (I will elaborate on that in my policy recommendation section).

As previously mentioned, proponents of protectionist trade policies may cite tariffs, quotas, or subsidies as a means of preventing and combating dumping. Even after considering the long-run economic infeasibility of such a market-penetration strategy, the WTO has the authority to present legal ramifications against its member countries who attempt to employ such a strategy.

According to Article VI of the GATT (which is still in effect as part of the WTO), all member countries are subject to the antidumping provisions set forth by the WTO (World Trade Organization, 2018).

Rather than incurring the deadweight loss to society as a result of protectionist policies to combat dumping (the cost of which if often paid by consumers), the US should let the legal authority of the WTO deal with foreign economies guilty of such strategies. For countries that are not members of the WTO, then and only then might protectionist trade policies be the most beneficial route to take for the welfare of the domestic economy.

Another route we could take is one of eliminating all tariffs, quotas, and other forms of trade restrictions/protectionist policies in all forms. Theoretically speaking, the benefits of allowing free trade speak for themselves; however, there would be numerous implications to such a strategy.

For one, we must consider the reasons we having some of our current trade restrictions. If countries that are not subject to the jurisdiction of the WTO are engaging in unfair trading practices, then pursing this route regarding protectionist trade policies would leave the US unable to combat such unfair practices.

In addition, such a radical change would most likely not be viewed very favorably in the eyes of the public (especially for domestic producers who may be put at a significant comparative disadvantage).

Policy Recommendation

An alternative route that I believe would be our best option would be an approach that is more mutually-beneficial. That approach would consist of the elimination (if not, a significant reduction) in the amount of protectionist trade polices federally legislated. In further pursuit of the benefits obtained by free trade, we ought to engage more in free trade agreements with other countries (especially with historically adversarial trading partners).

Consider the dynamics of the US’s trade relationship with China (the United States’ biggest trading partners, especially in terms of imports). I suggest we enter negotiation with the goal of a bilateral preferential trade agreement.

I believe that this route could change the dynamic of economic relationship between the US and China. This way, we could set terms and conditions regarding how we can maintain a trading relationship that brings benefits to both parties, rather than the current dynamic of attempts at benefiting each respective domestic economy at the cost of the other. In terms of game theory, we ought to purse a tit-for-tat strategy using compromise/cooperation rather than retaliation compared to the mentality of a zero-sum game (our benefits coming at China’s loss).

As mentioned previously, foreign wages (as a result from insufficient foreign labor laws) may be putting domestic firms at a disadvantage. Rather than a series of subsidies or retaliatory tariffs/quotes, negotiations through the process of trade agreements can help to address the issue.

Consider the recent renegotiation of North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) regarding automotive manufacturing wages with respect to Mexico. Under the renegotiation of NAFTA (now the US-Mexico-Canada Agreements, or USMCA), 40-45 percent of automotive content must be made by workers earning at least $16 USD per hour (Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2018). Although this provision applies to all member countries, it is meant to address the issues of US domestic auto manufacturers facing competition from Mexican production who had little regulation with regards to employee wages.

I believe we could use a similar tactic to achieve both political objectives and eliminate unfair competition with other countries by pursing this route.

While this option may the most pragmatic approach to take, a significant issue with pursing such a route is with public support. Some of the population will view an anti-protectionist approach to trade policy as “un-patriotic” considering it might result in the displacement of jobs in domestic industries, such as those in manufacturing or agriculture as previously discussed. This is when the role of government suasion comes to be a necessity (Peters, 2013).

In order to gain public approval, the government has the responsibility of using relevant data at its disposal to demonstrate that an anti-protectionist approach is best way improve societal benefit with the least cost. A cost-benefit analysis of the effects of removing protectionist trade policies can be published that show a forecasted impact of policy decisions (Peters, 2013).

Such an analysis can be done by constructing statistical models based off of historical numbers (adjusted for inflation) that represent the effect on employment and consumer benefit gained following the elimination of protectionist trade policies. These models could then be used to forecast the results that my suggested approach would have on the current economy.

Even with the best models and attempts at forecasting, it is still impossible to predict the future with 100 percent accuracy. An incremental approach would be the best way to minimize the short-term effects. With this tactic, we would be better able to monitor deviations from model predictions between actual results and adjust policy measures accordingly prior to the implementation the next stage of protectionist-reduction. The stages of implementation of reduction in protectionist policies would be a gradual decrease in rates of tariffs/quotas/subsidies/etcetera rather than an immediate elimination).

Even after illustrating the benefits that consumers would experience, there are still issues presented with those whose jobs are displaced as a result of these policy changes. Some of those displaced will be low-skilled blue-collared workers that do not have skills that are easily transferable to other industries (or who have high-skills that are still not readily transferable).

The government can alleviate this burden by using some of the benefits gained by consumers (resulting from lower prices) to provide short-term assistance to those displaced (short-term assistance because structural changes of the economy over the long-run will negate the negative short-term impact).

The collection of programs underneath the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) for Workers Program part of the Department of Labor could be used to help with such a process. The purpose of the TAA is to provide assistance to workers who have been adversely affected by foreign trade (Employment and Training Administration United States Department Of Labor, 2017). Considering the similarity in scope of the purpose of this program, the main adjustments that would need to be made would be within the budgeting resulting from an expected increase in displaced workers (compared to recent historical trends).

Not only would this provide direct benefits to the displaced workers, but it would also minimize those becoming reliant on the welfare system. Proper usage of the TAA program could provide the displaced workers with transferable skills, who could then add to productivity in other sectors of the domestic economy in additional to no longer needing government benefits.

Regardless of the specificities of the program, government intervention to address the needs of those workers is a necessity as stated by the Founding Fathers regarding the role of the government – to “promote the general welfare [of the people]”. This approach that I suggest would immediately benefit consumers and over the long-run and set the trend of increased productivity in domestic production for generations to come.

Appendix A – Economic Analysis of Tariffs

The term consumer surplus is defined as the difference between the prices that a consumer/buyer is willing to pay for a service or good compared to the price that they actually pay. It is calculated by subtracting the price paid from the maximum buying price. When being derived graphically, it is the area below the demand curve and above the effective price.

Similarly, the term producers’ (or sellers’) surplus is defined as the difference between the prices that a seller/producer receives for a good compared to the lowest or minimum price that they would have been willing to sell the good. It is calculated by subtracting the minimum selling price from the price received. When being derived graphically, it is the area above the supply curve and below the effective price (Arnold, 2016).

A deadweight loss is a term used to refer to the loss to society of not producing at the naturally competitive level of output. When the market is at a state of perfect competition, the given market meets four basic assumptions: there are many sellers and buyers, the sellers sell a homogenous good, buyers and sellers have all relevant information, and entry into and exit from the market is relatively easy. In such a scenario, the price is determined by the market and producers must respond accordingly (Arnold, 2016).






 



(Arnold, 2016)

While the reality of the free-market is seldom (if ever) at a state of perfect competition, it helps with the comprehension of the economic models that can be useful when applied to real-world situations. With an understanding of the elementary economic terms, we are able to observe the effects of government interventionist policies on the natural state of the supply and demand of the otherwise free-market. Consider the following graph:

Prior to the effects of the tariff, the consumer equilibrium consisted of the area marked by 1-6 and the consumer surplus is the areas marked by 7. Because there is no interference in the market at this point, there is no revenue collected by the government.

Following the implementation of the tariff, there are changes in the consumer surplus, produce surplus, and amount of revenue collected by the government. The consumer surplus decreases by the areas market 3-6, leaving the surplus to be the areas marked by 1 and 2. The produced surplus increase by the area marked 3, thus increasing the consumer surplus to 3 and 7. The amount of revenue generated by the tariff collected by the government is market by the areas 5 (which can also be calculated by multiplying the amount of the tariff by the market quantity).

After considering the effect on the producer surplus, the consumer surplus, and the amount collected by the government, there still remains the areas marked by 4 and 6. These two areas represent the deadweight loss to society – the value that is not gained by producers, consumers, nor in the form of revenue collected by the government, thus resulting in a net loss to society as a whole.

Appendix B – Game Theory

Game theory is defined as “a mathematical technique used to analyze the behavior of decision makers who try to reach an optimal position for themselves through game playing or the use of strategic behavior who are fully aware of the interactive nature of the process at hand, and who anticipate the moves of other decision makers” in a competitive environment (Arnold, 2016).

There are different types of “games” that can be applied to real-world situations. A zero sum game is a scenario when the benefit achieved by one participating party comes at the expense of the other party. Zero sum games are exemplified in the world of business when two businesses are competing for a customer. There can only be one party involved to win the business of the customer.

Consider a game-theoretical analysis in the example of the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’. In this example, each party knows the options of the other party and are unable to communicate with the other to formulate any sort of strategy. The outcome as a result of each combination of actions is listed as follows:






In this situation, regardless of whether or not Bob confesses, Nathan will be better off by confessing. Similarly for Bob, regardless of whether or not Nathan confesses, Bob will be better off by confessing. As a result, both parties will end up confessing and end up in box 4, with each paying a $3,000 fine; however, if they would have been able to cooperate, they could have both chosen not to confess and each only face a $2,000 fine.

A tit-for-tat game theory strategy is a game theory strategy that realizes the benefit of cooperation in competitive games and utilizes such a benefit until otherwise provoked (such as the negotiation of trade deals). This strategy was discovered by Robert Axelrod as an application for the prisoner’s dilemma example except lasting multiple rounds. The mathematically-optimal scenario throughout multiple tests was to begin by not confess and continue to not confess until the opponent confessed. Once the opponent confessed, the program would then “punish” the opponent by confessing (Landsburg, 2008).

For a more applicable example, consider two national economies. Economy A may attempt to utilize the benefits of free trade by not imposing tariffs on economy B as a gesture of preliminary cooperation. If economy B chooses not to impose tariffs and allow free trade with economy A, then the two economies would continue with cooperation and both benefiting; however, in economy B chooses to implement tariffs, then economy A would subsequently retaliate with tariffs.

Appendix C – Economic Analysis of Quotas






(Arnold, 2016)


Consider an import quota on a given good imposed by the US government. Prior to the implementation of the quota, domestic demand matches the price world price at its state of equilibrium. If domestic production does not meet domestic demand, then the difference in demand is imported into the US (the difference is that area marked Q2 – Q1). As a result, the consumer surplus is market by the areas 1 – 6 and the producers’ surplus is the area marked 7. Foreign suppliers are benefiting by the areas marked 4 – 6.

Following the implementation of the quota, the domestic price is increased (as a result of the decrease of supply of the good) to the point marked PQ. The consumer surplus is decreased to the areas marked 1 and 2 (because they can no longer enjoy the relatively cheaper imported good). Producers surplus increases to the areas now marked 3 and 7 (because of less competition from imports, demand for domestically produced goods will increase despite higher price levels). The benefits that foreign producers receive from exporting their good to the US decrease to the area market 5.

Similar to the net effect from a tariff, the areas marked by 4 and 6 are not gained by producers, consumers, or from foreign producers, and is thus a deadweight loss/net loss to society.

Appendix D – Economic Analysis of Subsidies

For simplicity of analysis, we will consider the scenario of a government-issued subsidy per unit produced provided to consumers. Consider the following graph:










(Landsburg, 2008)

Prior to the subsidy, the economy remains at a state of equilibrium where supply is equal to demand. This results in a consumer surplus of A and C and a sellers’ surplus of F and H. Consequently, the total net benefit to society at such a market-state is represented by the areas A, C, F, and H.

A per unit subsidy on consumers results in the demand curve effectively shifting to the right (because at any given quantity, consumers are willing to demand a higher quantity of the given good because of the incentive of the subsidy).

As a result, the consumer surplus consists of the area marked by A, C, F, and G. The suppliers’ surplus now consists of the area marked by C, D, F, and H. The cost of the subsidy to taxpayers (which can, similarly to the cost of a tariff, be calculated by multiplying the quantity times the quantity of the good consumers/produced) is composed of the area marked by C, D, E, F, and G.

After considering the additional consumer and supplier surplus, the total benefit to society consists of the areas marked A, C, F, and H. After considering the cost of the subsidy to taxpayers, the difference is the cost paid by taxpayers in the area market E. In this case, E represents a deadweight loss to society.

Appendix E

When a price floor is implemented, the government sets the market price for a given good above that of the otherwise equilibrium price of the natural market. Consider the following graph:








(Arnold, 2016)


 Following a price floor, the producer's surplus will increase from the areas initially market by 4 and 5 to the areas marked 2 – 5. The consumer surplus, on the other hand, will experience a decrease from areas 1 – 3 to only 1.

Government-set maximum pricing, also referred to as price ceilings, has a similar net effect on society (such as rent control in the real estate market).


 

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